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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Tenth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! We regret that this 
year it will be a “paper only” event. The double whammy of sequestration and a continuing 
resolution, with the attendant restrictions on travel and conferences, created too much 
uncertainty to properly stage the event. We will miss the dialogue with our acquisition 
colleagues and the opportunity for all our researchers to present their work. However, we 
intend to simulate the symposium as best we can, and these Proceedings present an 
opportunity for the papers to be published just as if they had been delivered. In any case, we 
will have a rich store of papers to draw from for next year’s event scheduled for May 14–15, 
2014! 
Despite these temporary setbacks, our Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) continues at a normal pace. Since the ARP’s 
founding in 2003, over 1,200 original research reports have been added to the acquisition 
body of knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 70 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and encourage your future participation. 
Unfortunately, what will be missing this year is the active participation and 
networking that has been the hallmark of previous symposia. By purposely limiting 
attendance to 350 people, we encourage just that. This forum remains unique in its effort to 
bring scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. It provides the opportunity to interact with many top DoD 
acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both in the formal 
panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, breaks, and the 
day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to establish new teaming 
arrangements for future research work. Despite the fact that we will not be gathered 
together to reap the above-listed benefits, the ARP will endeavor to stimulate this dialogue 
through various means throughout the year as we interact with our researchers and DoD 
officials.  
Affordability remains a major focus in the DoD acquisition world and will no doubt get 
even more attention as the sequestration outcomes unfold. It is a central tenet of the DoD’s 
Better Buying Power initiatives, which continue to evolve as the DoD finds which of them 
work and which do not. This suggests that research with a focus on affordability will be of 
great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to come. Whether you’re a practitioner or 
scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
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Abstract 
This report describes the preliminary analysis and findings of our study exploring what drives 
successful organizational adaptation in the context of technology transition and acquisition 
within the Department of Defense (DoD). It is based on our initial collection and analysis of 
archival and interview data. We began this study seeking to understand what influences the 
successful transition of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies to the warfighter, 
focusing on the Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration (JCTD) office as a successful 
case study. In the course of our investigation, we noted shifts in organization structure, goals, 
and business processes of the JCTD in response to changing needs of warfighters in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Further exploration indicated that these shift were not unique to the JCTD, 
but were one example of many adaptive solutions to changing needs faced by the DoD 
acquisition community. This led us to focus our research on better understanding what drives 
successful organizational adaptation. Our preliminary analysis suggests that ad hoc problem 
solving may be an undervalued yet broadly practiced skill set within the DoD, which may 
support adaptive responses to change by the acquisition community. We are currently 
collecting additional data, which we will use to further explicate our findings. 
Introduction 
Defense acquisition is a key technical and business function, vital to the success of 
the U.S. military. However, it is also the focus of seemingly constant critique and reform. 
Most recently, the rapidly changing global environment and tactics of adversaries have 
highlighted gaps in the organization’s business process capability, intensifying the calls for 
process reform. It is widely recognized that DoD acquisition must become more nimble and 
flexible to more rapidly deploy materiel solutions to new and emerging problems and that 
doing so will require changes in organization structure, culture, and processes. What is less 
clear is how to gain the most value from investment in change efforts, which can have 
substantial direct and indirect cost implications. This question is the focus of this report of 
the preliminary conclusions based on an ongoing qualitative study.  
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We began this study seeking to understand what influences the successful transition 
of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies to the warfighter, focusing on the Joint 
Capabilities Technology Demonstration (JCTD) office as a successful case study. In the 
course of our investigation, we noted shifts in organization structure, goals, and business 
processes of the JCTD office resulting from responses to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Further exploration indicated that these shifts were not unique to the JCTD office but that 
the shifts we observed were one example of many adaptive solutions to changing needs 
faced by the DoD acquisition community. In order to better understand technology transition 
in the current context and in accordance with a grounded research approach, we adapted 
our analysis plan to focus on what drives successful adaptation (Howard-Grenville, Golden-
Biddle, Irwin, & Mao, 2011; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Lofland, Snow, Anderson & Lofland, 
2006). This report is based on our initial collection and analysis of archival and interview 
data. We are continuing to collect data through interviews and document searches, following 
a process of theoretical sampling (Locke, 2001; Clarke, 2005) selecting subjects and 
documents to elaborate on the concepts reported here.  
Since 2001 and 2003, respectively, U.S. engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq have 
highlighted gaps in certain capabilities: U.S. warfighters were not always equipped for the 
unique challenges they faced under unanticipated scenarios. This was evidenced by 
casualties incurred and the submission of more than 7,000 urgent need statements 
(Gansler, 2009). As these conflicts ensued, more than 20 organizations and a variety of 
business process changes emerged to meet warfighter needs. This situation, and the 
responses to it, are the focus of the widely cited “Gansler report” (2009), which forms a 
context for this study. The Gansler report stated, “The essence of the problem is the need to 
field militarily useful solutions faster,” and “the reality is that the Department is not geared to 
acquire and field capabilities in a rapidly shifting threat environment” (2009, p. viii). The 
Gansler report concluded that the ad hoc organizations and effective processes that 
emerged to meet the unanticipated needs of U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan should be 
consolidated, codified, and institutionalized. This conclusion is frequently interpreted as 
criticism of the extant acquisition process and used to justify further expansion of ad hoc 
solutions (see, for example, Warfighter Support: DoD’s Urgent Needs Processes Need a 
More Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential Consolidation, GAO, 2011). 
In accordance with what is formally termed an “entrepreneurial mindset” (Haynie, 
Shepherd, Mosakowski, & Earley, 2010), we reframe this interpretation and seek to 
contribute to positive changes in U.S. defense acquisition through an analysis based on it. 
Specifically, we explore the implications to DoD acquisition from “standing up more than 20 
ad hoc offices, agencies, task forces, funds, and other organizations to respond and fulfill 
these diverse needs” (Gansler, 2009) and the problem-solving these entities engaged in to 
emerge as an exemplary case of organizational adaptation to unexpected changes. When 
conducting qualitative case studies, researchers should “go for extreme situations, critical 
incidents and social dramas … where the progress is transparently observable” (Pettigrew, 
1990, p. 275). Given the tremendous size and bureaucratic nature of the DoD, the vital role 
of acquisition on the organization’s outcomes, and the sudden and unpredictable external 
change presented by the September 2001 attacks and subsequent U.S. engagements in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, we view the acquisition community’s response as an extreme case, 
justifying focused, qualitative exploration.  
Furthermore, we argue that reframing the Gansler report (2009), to view the 
response as an exemplary, positive case, highlights a heretofore under-appreciated skill set, 
at which the DoD may excel. Based on our reframing and research on organizational 
routines, dynamic capabilities, learning, and change, we examine the cost and benefits of 
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investments in this skill set and other business capabilities. Management scholars use the 
term capability to refer to a high-level, patterned and repetitious routine that confers a set of 
decision options for producing outputs (Winter, 2003, p. 991). In this report, we will use the 
term organizational capability to distinguish this concept from the concept of a military 
capability, which is perhaps more familiar to our audience. 
This report proceeds as follows. First, we ground the study by describing the 
organizational context of DoD acquisition and the events that resulted in recognition of the 
need for rapid fielding. Next, we analyze and reframe the 2009 Gansler report. Then, we 
describe the case of the JCTD and our methods for analyzing it. We explore the potential 
costs and benefit implications of different approaches to securing adaptive business 
responses. We conclude by summarizing our preliminary analysis and describing the next 
steps in our ongoing study. 
Defense Acquisition and the Shock of September 2001 
Acquisition is big business. Each year, the DoD spends over $100 billion for 
research, development, procurement, and support of weapon systems. Acquisition is also a 
rule-intensive business. In addition to myriad laws governing federal acquisition in the U.S., 
a plethora of regulations specify how to accomplish the planning, review, execution, and 
oversight of defense acquisition programs, large and small, sole-source and competitive, 
military and commercial. Due in some part to the large size and many rules associated with 
defense acquisition, the organizations responsible for these activities tend to be large and 
rule-intensive themselves, reflecting the kinds of centralized, formalized, specialized, and 
oversight-intensive forms corresponding to the classic “machine bureaucracy” from 
organization theory. The problem is, this classic organizational structure is well known to be 
exceptionally poor at responding to change. In the context of military transformation, such a 
problem should be clear and compelling. But which superior organizational approaches are 
available to acquisition leaders and policymakers? What evidence supports claims of 
superiority for one organizational approach versus another? Questions such as these are 
difficult to answer through most research methods employed to study organizations (e.g., 
case studies, surveys, etc.). 
Defense acquisition has been characterized by frequent and extensive critique and 
reform over the past 50 years leading at least one author to argue that “the only constant in 
the military’s acquisition system is the continuous reform” (Rasche, 2011). However, driven 
by the changing demands of warfighters, the commercial rate of technological development, 
and defense budget constraints, the nature and speed of change in the acquisition system 
has intensified over the past decade. “Today’s adversaries are changing their tactics, 
techniques, and procedures at an accelerated pace, heightening the need for U.S. forces to 
respond rapidly to new threats” (Gansler, 2009). We briefly summarize key reformation 
events of the past two decades below. 
 In 1993, then Vice President Al Gore’s Creating a Government that Works Better 
and Costs Less: The Gore Report on Reinventing Government sought to reduce 
government waste and inefficiency, calling upon the DoD acquisition community to simplify 
procurement, eliminate regulatory burden, and rely to a greater degree on the commercial 
marketplace. The Clinton administration was oriented toward “reinventing government” by 
improving government processes, including procurement. Secretary of Defense Leslie Aspin 
voiced his concerns that acquisition program costs and schedule problems would threaten 
the ability of the military Services to continue to acquire the newest technologies that had 
performed so well during the Persian Gulf War. Aspin proposed a “resource strategy” to 
allow the DoD to afford the best technology in a times of austerity. 
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Shortly thereafter, Secretary of Defense William Perry released the memo “A 
Mandate for Change,” which called for a cultural change within the DoD, shifting the DoD’s 
focus from the acquisition process to its outcome in the field and asserting that the major 
obstacles to positive change were internal. Acquisition reform continued under the 
leadership of Secretary of Defense William Cohen, who, in a 1997, expressed the 
importance of continuing to reform the way the DoD did business, demanding that the 
department must be “lean, agile, and focused as our warfighters.” The report’s main 
assertion was that overhead and support activities be reduced and reallocated to warfighters 
in light of new threats and constrained budgets. In 2000, “The Road Ahead: Accelerating the 
Transformation of the Department of Defense Acquisition and Logistics Processes and 
Practices” detailed the Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA), which called for best practices 
from the private sector to be implemented in a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The 
report argued that  
the Department continues to rely on acquisition processes, organizations and 
infrastructure largely developed in the years following World War II [and] 
continues to face a limited investment budget, and squeezed by increased 
operations and support costs from aging weapons systems. (Gansler, 2000) 
On September 10, 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld gave a speech in 
which he expressed his determination to save the Pentagon from itself. The Secretary 
claimed that the Pentagon bureaucracy was the “serious threat” to national security, but he 
clarified, saying, “Not the people, the processes. Not the civilians, but the systems. Not the 
men and women in uniform, but the uniformity of thought and action that we too often 
impose on them.” Rumsfeld’s vision for reform included commercial outsourcing of functions 
not directly related to warfighting to save money, streamlining the system development 
process to match the private sector’s, and retaining a quality workforce within the military 
forces and acquisition community. Immediately after Rumsfeld’s call, the events of 
September 11th occurred, along with the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. These 
soon highlighted gaps in the DoD’s ability to rapidly deploy solutions to its warfighters facing 
their new scenarios and problems. 
In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the rapid adaptation of enemy capabilities highlighted 
the need for rapid response by the acquisition community. The use of improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs) in Iraq is a frequently cited example of enemy forces exploiting “capability 
gaps in the technology, systems, and equipment used by U.S. forces” (GAO, 2011). 
Combatant commands submitted more than 7,000 statements for urgent solutions, resulting 
in the eventual creation of  “over 20 ad hoc offices, agencies, task forces, funds and other 
organizations to meet warfighter needs” (Gansler, 2009).  
The Gansler Report 
In 2009, the Defense Science Board’s Task Force on the Fulfillment of Urgent 
Operational Needs published a report known widely as the Gansler report, which analyzed 
the DoD’s rapid acquisition process. The core finding of the report was that major 
institutional changes needed to be made to the existing DoD acquisition process. The report 
asserted that “rapid” is counter to the current acquisition workforce culture and that the 
current ad-hoc system is not sustainable and will not create a permanent solution. 
Furthermore, the report cited institutional barriers (people, funding, and processes) as 
powerful inhibitors to successful rapid acquisition within the DoD. Thus, the report argued 
that not all DoD needs can be met by the same acquisition process and that the DoD must 
create and codify a separate “rapid” process. 
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According to the Gansler report (2009), although field commanders were resourceful 
in acquiring local solutions, the enemy’s new tactics exploited the DoD’s inability to rapidly 
field new capabilities. The Gansler report did recognize the efforts of the acquisition 
community, stating, for example, “It is hard to criticize the industrious nature of those in the 
Department who have made something happen when urgent needs have been presented” 
(Gansler, 2009, p. 9). However, its overall perspective and its interpretation in subsequent 
citations is a largely critical call for reform: “These approaches do not offer a long-term 
solution” (Gansler, 2009, p. 9). In particular, the report highlighted the ad hoc, work-around 
nature of the solutions, noting that “numerous rapid reaction programs and organizations 
have been established in recent years to respond to combatant commander needs—
processes that work within and around the traditional system to get solutions into the field” 
(Gansler, 2009, p. 6), and citing a lack of institutional changes to organize, formalize, and 
codify the ad hoc approaches as evidence of continued failure.  
By and large, the Gansler report (2009) represented the breadth of criticisms of the 
DoD rapid acquisition process and its ad hoc entities since their emergence shortly after the 
invasion of Iraq. More recent assessments offer similar criticisms. The GAO’s (2011) report 
to congressional committees in 2011 titled Warfighter Support: DoD’s Urgent Needs 
Processes Need a More Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential 
Consolidation identified at least 31 separate entities that manage urgent acquisition needs. 
The report claimed that the numerous points through which a warfighter may submit a 
request for an urgent need is an example of redundancy and inter-agency overlap. The 
GAO (2011) asserted that the DoD does not have a comprehensive policy for how urgent 
needs are to be addressed, lacks visibility over the full range of its urgent needs efforts, has 
no senior-level focal point to lead the department’s efforts to fulfill urgent needs, and has not 
evaluated opportunities for consolidation, resulting in unnecessary costs. The GAO (2011) 
ultimately attributed the need for the many ad hoc processes that currently exist to a failure 
of the DoD to predict change in the external environment, saying, “The department had not 
anticipated the accelerated pace of change in enemy tactics and techniques that ultimately 
heightened the need for a rapid response to new threats in Afghanistan and Iraq.” 
The conclusions and tone of these reports appear critical of the so-called ad hoc 
solutions. For example, the Gansler report noted, “While these programs have produced 
significant successes, their ad-hoc, one of a kind nature has created a different set of 
problems. They rely on learning on the job with little emphasis on support training and 
sustainment” (Gansler, 2009, p. 6). Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the bureaucratic nature 
and culture of the DoD, the reports call for centralization, formalization, and codification to 
correct the problem presented to the DoD organization by the ad hoc organizations and 
processes. Indeed, we have previously suggested that the DoD has a propensity or 
preference toward such centralization, to its own detriment (Dillard, 2005). Given the current 
nature and culture of the DoD, the survival of rapid or urgent fielding capabilities may indeed 
depend on some form of the solutions recommended in these reports. However, we argue it 
is important to note that in framing ad hoc responses as a problem and then offering a 
solution, these reports fail to address the institutional and cultural environment, which they 
argue cannot sustain innovation. Of perhaps greater concern, it is possible that enacting the 
recommendations of the reports without full consideration of the value of the ad hoc problem 
solving that occurred and the costs associated with building a “dynamic capability,” the DoD 
may eventually lose a valuable source of business process and organizational innovation 
and adaptation and/or may overinvest in a costly organizational solution, when a less costly 
alternative may suffice.  
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Research Context: Framing Rapid Fielding 
We situate this study in a reframing of the widely cited Gansler report of 2009. Our 
reframing is conducted in the spirit of the accepted wisdom that creative solutions often 
require “thinking out of the box” or “lateral thinking” (De Bono, 1967), which we equate more 
formally with adopting an entrepreneurial mindset—described below—and guided by a 
research approach based on frame analysis. We undertake this exploration not to argue 
against specific recommendations of the Gansler report, but rather because we believe that 
a problem of such persistence and consequence deserves considered reflection from 
multiple perspectives. 
Research Framework 
An entrepreneurial mindset is the ability to “think differently,” to sense, act, and 
mobilize under uncertain conditions (Haynie et al., 2010). Adaptive thinking hinges on “the 
ability to be dynamic, flexible, and self-regulating in one’s cognitions” (Haynie et al., 2010, p. 
218) and is of fundamental importance to entrepreneurs or others facing uncertain task 
environments. Adaptive thinking is dependent on metacognitive processes—thinking about 
thinking—which enable individuals to think beyond existing heuristics and knowledge 
structures in order to be adaptable. A metacognitive strategy refers to the mental framework 
formulated by an individual, through which to evaluate multiple, alternative responses to 
processing a task. Researchers have demonstrated that employing a metacognitive strategy 
can improve the outcome of problem solving by helping individuals avoid using a flawed 
approach for addressing a problem (Staw & Boettger, 1990; Haynie et al., 2010).  
Drawing on these arguments, Haynie et al. (2010) argued that successful 
entrepreneurs will be those that formulate a metacognitive strategy to generate alternative 
approaches to thinking about how to accomplish tasks in ambiguous environments. In other 
words, entrepreneurs who succeed will be those who can develop multiple, alternative ways 
of thinking about a problem. We approached this research in this spirit, seeking an 
alternative strategy for thinking about the problem of acquisition reform in order to evaluate 
possible responses. 
A metacognitive strategy requires metacognitive awareness, that is, awareness 
concerning one’s own thinking. We thus undertook an examination of the logic, 
assumptions, and links between these and the conclusions presented in the Gansler report. 
Our examination followed the norms and precepts of frame analysis as developed in 
organization research (Benford & Snow, 2000; Creed, Langstraat, & Scully, 2002).  
Frames are “action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate 
that activities and campaigns” created through conversations and written communication 
that connect events and experiences (Benford & Snow, 2000). Core framing tasks include 
diagnostic framing, the identification of problems and causes; and prognostic framing, the 
articulation of a proposed solution. Institutional solutions to problems result when recurring 
or widespread problems are theorized, or described in general terms, and agreed upon, 
pointing to a particular solution (Suchman, 1995). Following Creed et al. (2002), we 
developed a signature matrix to sort the idea elements found in the Gansler report into 
categories that support the functions of interpretation, argumentation, punctuation, 
elaboration, and motivation. This allowed us to discern key elements of the frame and 
consider alternatives. 
The Framing of the Gansler Report 
The Gansler report (2009) depicted the response to the unanticipated needs of 
warfighters in Afghanistan and Iraq as evidence that the DoD cannot respond to changing 
needs. The report framed the emergence of many organizations and the lack systematic, 
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codified processes as evidence of failure, and problems, which must be corrected. In 
particular, the report highlighted the lack of sustainable funding for ad hoc processes as a 
problem for which the solution is codification, centralization, and formalization. Although this 
is a logical solution to the problem as framed in the report, an alternate frame might suggest 
other possible solutions.  
In the Gansler report, the large number of requests to meet urgent needs, and the 
highly visible problem of IEDs, are used to support the assertion that the DoD “lacks the 
ability to rapidly field new capabilities” (2009). The text of the report includes the phrase “in a 
systematic and effective way,” linking the assertion of failure and a lack of systematic 
processes to ineffectiveness. This depiction is further linked to an overall presentation of the 
problem or the diagnostic frame; the lack of systematic processes makes the current 
solution unsustainable, and as the problem is the lack of systematic processes, the solution 
is therefore the creation of a systematic, codified process in a formal, centralized 
organization. The latest update of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
instruction, CJCSI 3170.01H (2012), already reflects some implementation of this 
recommendation. 
Although some successful outcomes result from ad hoc organizations and business 
processes, recognition of achievements are followed by critiques of the processes that 
achieved them. Variation is presented as redundant and costly. Ad hoc problem solving is 
not systematic or codified (and linked to ineffective and unsustainable). Workarounds, 
although recognized as necessary, are depicted as “disjointed” (linked to unsystematic and 
ineffective). For example, 
Over the past five years there have been many success stories and lessons 
Learned. … However, in the larger picture, the DoD has not made major, 
institutional changes in budgeting and acquisition essential to posture itself 
for the ongoing hybrid warfare reality. DoD is not systematically prepared to 
anticipate and respond to urgent and dynamically changing needs that will be 
a permanent part of 21st century operations.  
When progress is noted, it (progress) refers to codification, as in this example:  
The Joint Staff, COCOMs, and the Services have all codified in directives 
new processes to identify urgent needs and provide rapid responses. Recent 
progress includes a detailed urgent needs process memorandum circulated 
by the Secretary of the Navy in March 2009.  
The arguments of the report support the recommendation to restructure the 
organization and to create a codified, systematic process for rapid fielding. This 
recommendation is consistent with the bureaucratic nature and culture of the DoD and with 
past routines for codifying, reorganizing, and centralizing. However, a reframing of the 
problem allows a deeper consideration of factors mentioned but not emphasized in the 
report and illuminates heretofore underemphasized or overlooked implications of the report’s 
recommendations. 
An Alternate Perspective 
We explored the question “What is the most cost effective means of achieving the 
dynamic and adaptive business capabilities DoD seems to require?” We began by reframing 
the Gansler report. A summary of our analysis and reframing is shown in Table 1. In our 
reframing, we considered the establishment of 20 (and eventually more than 30) 
organizational entities over a period of a few years and their development of associated 
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business models and processes to be an amazing adaptive response to an external shock 
by a bureaucratic organization, which would be expected to be hampered by severe inertia. 
 Framing of the Gansler Report 
Focal event Warfighters in Afghanistan and Iraq have unanticipated equipment needs 
 Gansler Frame Representative Quote Alternate Frame 
Depiction DoD has not 
responded/cannot 
respond. 
DoD lacks the ability to rapidly 
field new capabilities to the 





What is the 
problem? 
Current rapid fielding 
process is 
unsustainable. 
The essence of the problem is the 
need to field militarily useful 
solutions faster. 
 
Current approaches to implement 
rapid responses to urgent needs 
are not sustainable. 
Adapting (business organization) 
to changing environment. 
 
Current process is an example of 








The procedures these 
organizations have developed … 
vary across the DoD … definitions 
and regulations that apply to the 
processes vary [and words] … are 
sometimes used in conflicting and 
overlapping ways. 
Variation is a necessary 
component of change. 
Ad hoc problem 
solving is 
problematic. 
Their ad hoc, one-of-a-kind nature 
has created a different set of 
problems. They rely on learning 
on the job with little emphasis on 
support, training, and 
sustainment. 
Ad hoc problem solving is a “low 




All also utilize workarounds … to 
sidestep traditional acquisition and 
fielding process, but these are 
generally disjointed. 
Workarounds allow creativity 





DoD needs to codify and 
institutionalize “rapid” acquisition 
processes and practices. 
Codification is costly. The full 
value lies in the knowledge 
gained through the process, 










The Secretary of Defense should 
establish a new agency. 
Evaluate costs/benefits of ad hoc 
solutions and seek solutions that 
retain diverse skill sets. 
Our perspective is not without precedent, even within the DoD. In a 2011 report, 
Lessons Learned From Rapid Acquisition: Better, Faster, Cheaper?, Colonel Robert A. 
Rasch examined the impacts of wartime acquisition initiatives on the DoD acquisition 
systems. Rasch framed the continual reform of DoD acquisition as a possible indicator of 
positive adaptive change. Perhaps best known is the large scale and rapid acquisition of at 
least 7,000 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles in just over two years. The 
need for MRAP vehicles was initially articulated, in February of 2005 by Marines who 
needed protection from IEDs, RPGs, and small-arms fire. The need was met through a 
variety of ad hoc solutions involving innovative adaptations to standard processes for 
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establishing requirements, evaluating progress, and contracting. This instance is cited as an 
exemplary outcome in GAO reports (GAO, 2009). 
Viewing this response above as a successful solution suggests a reconsideration of 
the definition of the problem. The Gansler report (2009) is clearly focused on the immediate 
need for rapid fielding, as tasked, and our reframing should not be viewed as a criticism of 
those efforts. However, when given the luxury of reflective consideration afforded a research 
project (as opposed to the task specific demands facing a decisively engaged military force), 
the context of the organization, past attempts at reform and an environment characterized 
by unpredictable events, suggest a broader and persistent need for business adaptability. 
We reframe the problem in terms of this broader need: The DoD must adapt its business 
model and processes to meet unpredictable demands from the external environment. This 
need is recognized in the Gansler report:  
The global landscape has changed the national security environment, 
demanding the ability to rapidly access and field capabilities from any source. 
Agile adversaries are taking advantage of important, globally available 
technologies by rapidly creating and fielding highly effective weapons. 
Moreover, the nation faces a vast range of potential contingencies around the 
world. … This set of circumstances calls for rapid adaptation on the part of 
the United States as well—adaptation of tactics, techniques, and procedures 
[emphasis added] as well as the ability to field new [warfighting] capabilities 
on a timeframe unfamiliar to the bureaucratic processes that dominate 
acquisition in the Department of Defense today. (2009, p. 3) 
However, the overriding focal problem highlighted by the framing of the Gansler 
report is the need for a rapid fielding capability. Reframing the problem as we have done 
suggests a reconsideration of the role and value of variation, ad hoc problem solving, and 
codification. The Gansler report frames these factors as contributors to the problem. In our 
reframing, we considered the role of variation as precursor to change, workarounds as a 
mechanism for allowing creativity within a bureaucracy, and the benefits of  codification as 
deriving from the process of articulation and clarification as much as (or even more than) 
from written output. Our reframing suggests a need to evaluate the costs and benefits of ad 
hoc problem solving versus codified business capabilities and to seek overall solutions that 
most efficiently support the business adaptability in an unpredictable environment. 
Research Approach and Methods 
We began our study of the JCTD case with the question of what best influences the 
successful transition of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies to the warfighter. 
During our initial investigation, we noted shifts in organization structure, goals, and business 
processes of the JCTD office in response to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In accordance 
with a grounded research approach (Howard-Grenville et al., 2011; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; 
Lofland et al., 2006), we adapted our analysis plan to focus on how the organization was 
adapting to change. This report is based on our initial collection and analysis of archival and 
interview data. The organization is once again adapting as the need for rapid fielding in 
Afghanistan and Iraq diminish, and our analysis to this point must thus be considered 
preliminary. We are continuing to collect data through interviews and document searches, 
following a process of theoretical sampling (Locke, 2001; Clarke, 2005). 
We began this study with a review of literature related to the JCTD office and the 
evolution of defense acquisition processes. We also conducted a round of exploratory 
interviews with subject matter experts in the JCTD office. These were informal, unstructured 
interviews, designed to familiarize us with the history, operations, and evolution of the office. 
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We encouraged experts to elaborate on these topics and took detailed notes. In the course 
of the initial data collection, we noted an apparent and deliberate shift had occurred in the 
mission of the JCTD office in recent years, from demonstrating advanced militarily useful 
concepts with promising technologies towards rapid fielding of materiel and the importance 
of ad hoc problem solving.  
We collected additional data from two sources: a “snowballing” Google search and 
the Internet Archive (Nardon & Aten, 2008; Aten, 2010). On Google, we searched for all 
pages and documents with JCTD or ACTD and the word technology in the title from the year 
2000 to the present and saved each as a PDF, yielding more than 2,000 pages. We then 
followed links to identify additional pages and documents, yielding an initial 247 saved 
PDFs. We scanned all of the documents and excluded documents such as glossary pages, 
descriptions of acronyms, and descriptions and press releases related to particular JCTDs. 
This yielded a dataset that included presentation slides, JCTD announcements and policies, 
and descriptions of the organization.  
Next, we collected data from the Internet Archive (2009), “a non-profit organization 
that was founded to build an Internet library, with the purpose of offering permanent access 
for researchers, historians, and scholars to historical collections that exist in digital format.” 
The Internet Archive is searchable by URL with a search resulting in a list of hyperlinks to 
web pages for the specified URL, by date, that are included in the archive. Thus, one can 
view web pages of an organization as they existed for a particular year in the past. The 
archive for the ACTD and JCTD was intact, with multiple instances captured every year from 
2001 to the present. We reviewed one web page per year, adding instances as necessary 
when we noted major changes to ensure that we did not miss relevant documents. On each 
page, we followed links and printed PDF files of web pages and documents related to the 
evolution of the JCTD office. We selected pages and documents available from links titled 
introduction, guidelines, Q&A, links, organization, and what’s new. Our saved documents 
included conference presentation slides, management briefings, procedures and guidelines, 
organization charts, and the text of speeches. We did not save specific JCTD project 
descriptions, glossary pages, or point of contact information pages.  
We organized all of the documents by year and imported them into an Nvivo 
qualitative data analysis software project. We used Nvivo to code the data into broad 
categories suggested by our previous analysis: organization structure, business model 
(mission/goals, value proposition, measures), technology characteristics (maturity level, use, 
customer), and process characteristics (requirements, steps). We then generated reports 
allowing us to view examples from the broad categories across time.  
Research Setting: The Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration Office 
The JCTD program began in 1994 as the Advanced Concepts Technology 
Demonstration (ACTD), with the aim of more rapid prototyping and fielding of technology for 
the DoD by demonstrating and assessing the of the military utility of a technology. Over the 
18 years since its inception, the overall mission of the program has remained unchanged.  
History and Purpose 
In the late 1980s, the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense, also known 
as the Packard Commission, was charged by Executive Order 12526, in which President 
Reagan asked the commission to conduct a defense management study focusing on the 
budget process, the procurement of systems, the legislative oversight, and intra-government 
organizational arrangements in regard to defense. Among other things, the report indicated 
a high need for prototyping. The report stated that  
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a high priority should be given to building and testing prototype systems and 
subsystems before proceeding with full-scale development. This early phase 
of R&D should employ extensive informal competition and use streamlined 
procurement processes. It should demonstrate that the new technology under 
test can substantially improve military capability, and should as well provide a 
basis for making realistic cost estimates prior to a full scale development 
decision. This increased emphasis on prototyping should allow us to “fly and 
know how much it will cost before we buy.” 
The Packard Commission report, as well as several other Defense Science Board 
reports, led to the establishment of the ACTD. ACTDs are user-oriented and of a large 
enough scope to establish military utility. During the ACTD, the users (the warfighters) 
determine whether they will begin acquisition of the new technology. The ACTDs/JCTDs 
serve the Combatant Commands (COCOM) by fulfilling capability gaps the Services may not 
view as mission-critical but that the COCOMs are nonetheless requesting.  
In 2006, the ACTD became the JCTD. Although the core staff and office remained 
the same, the name change brought with it a change in focus; there was a shift to 
emphasizing the fulfillment of capabilities and an added emphasis on transitioning new 
technologies to the field for sustained use. Despite some changes in management, name, 
and participation of various agencies, the organizational structure of the ACTD/JCTD has 
remained fairly constant. An ACTD/JCTD is jointly sponsored and managed by a supporting 
user (the military) and the technology developer. Approval of ACTD/JCTDs is given by the 
Deputy Under Secretary for Advanced Systems and Concepts (DUSD [AS&C]). The 
ACTD/JCTD program maintains a significant cross-service, cross-agency involvement with a 
heavy focus on joint operations and COCOM participation. In September 2009, the DoD 
established the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Rapid Fielding 
(ODASD[RF]). Sometime shortly after its establishment, the ODASD(RF) was designated as 
the overseeing agency of the JCTD program.  
Although the personnel and management remained the same, the JCTD program 
claims to be implementing a new and enhanced business process to better meet the DoD’s 
transformational goal of becoming capabilities based. JCTDs focus directly on the COCOM’s 
most critical warfighter needs and proved a faster, more agile and integrated joint response 
to emerging asymmetrical threats. JCTDs emphasize increased upfront transition planning, 
provision for a higher level of OSD funding during the first two years, and bridge funding 
from Budget Activity Four for those projects that demonstrate compelling joint military utility. 
In the move from ACTD to JCTD the program eliminated several of the review processes, 
such as the so-called Breakfast Club, and limited the involvement of the Joint Chiefs. The 
program was redirected to focus more on capabilities and transitioning the new capabilities 
but also on rapid fielding; the ACTD program saw a 50–60% transition rate, as the JCTD 
program is seeing an 80–90% transition rate.  
Technology 
An important part of considering candidates to become an ACTD/JCTD is the 
technology readiness level (TRL). “Technology maturity is a measure of the degree to which 
proposed critical technologies meet program objectives; and, is a principal element of 
program risk.” The DoD Component Science and Technology (S&T) Executive directs the 
technology readiness levels and determines the level of maturity of a given system.  
There are nine TRL levels, each representing a major step forward in the 
development process of the system. ACTDs/JCTDs are largely previously proven 
technologies that will, by and large, have a TRL of 7, 8, or 9. A system that is ranked with a 
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TRL 7 has demonstrated “an actual system prototype in an operational environment.” TRL 8 
is assigned to technology that “has been proven to work in its final form and under expected 
conditions.” In almost all cases, this TRL represents the end of true system development. 
TRL 9 is assigned to technology “in its final form” and that has been proven through 
successful mission operations. 
There are several characteristics for which ACTD candidates are chosen: 
affordability, interoperability, sustainability, and potential for evolution. The affordability of a 
new capability was viewed from the perspective of the total ownership cost, to see whether 
the cost of the capability throughout its life cycle would hinder its eventual inclusion into the 
regular acquisition process. The new technology or capability was required to be 
interoperable because of the importance of implementing the technology in future 
operations. The new systems remain in the field, so sustainability was a crucial aspect. 
Finally, systems and capabilities were evaluated based on their potential to be updated as 
the situation or threat evolved.  
The TRL of ACTDs fluctuated depending on the type of system and the level of risk 
that managers and oversight organizations were willing to take. In the period before 2003, 
projects were much larger and assumed more risk in term of the readiness of the 
technologies (Global Hawk and Predator). The Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) was once one of the largest contributors to the funding of ACTDs; 
however, eventually DARPA’s involvement in the program waned, and so too did the large 
and risky nature of many ACTDs.    
As the ACTD transitioned to the JCTD and as time went on, the program became 
more focused on picking “the low hanging fruit” in the sense that ACTDs became more 
focused on smaller projects that assumed less risk. This has also been attributed to the 
increased focus of rapid fielding that was generated by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Figure 1 shows the relatively steady decline in the average estimated costs of the 
ACTD/JCTD projects by year for the last 10 years. The decline in costs coupled with the 
decline in the average length is evidence that lends itself to the notion that the program was, 
as one official put it, focused on “getting something out the door as quickly as possible.” 
 
 Average Estimated Costs of the ACTD/JCTD Projects by Year for 
the Last 10 Years  
More recently (in last few months) and after a change in management, the JCTD has 
encountered criticism for its increasing aversion to risk, which was generally coming from 
senior leadership of the program. Also, the need for rapid fielding has been lessened by the 
ending of the Iraq War and the winding-down of operations in Afghanistan. Now, there is an 
emerging desire to shift the JCTD back to its original style of bigger, better and riskier and to 
adapt once more.  
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Dynamic Capabilities and Ad Hoc Problem Solving: Pathways to Adaptability 
Although the political environment is not perfectly analogous to the business 
environment, some useful comparisons can be made. The shocks of 9/11 and enemy 
innovations suggest the acquisition community is facing, and will continue to face, a 
turbulent environment.  Studies of organizations operating in turbulent environments have 
focused on understanding the role of routines in change and adaptation. Scholars have 
argued that dynamic capabilities, or the ability to systematically change existing 
organizational routines are a key to success (Teece, 2007). However, Winter (2003) argued 
that the costs of creating dynamic capabilities may not be justifiable in turbulent 
environments. Winter’s (2003) argument, along with a recent discussion of anticipated 
consequences in such environments (Selsky et al., 2007), suggests that ad hoc problem 
solving may be an effective solution for adapting to change. We discuss these ideas below.  
Understanding organizational adaption and change is a key focus of organizations 
scholars. Organizational routines provide one avenue for exploring how organizations 
change their capabilities. Organizational routines are the basic components of 
organizational behavior and are a crucial to understanding how organizational capabilities 
are accumulated, transferred, and applied (Becker, Lazaric, Nelson, & Winter, 2005). Thus, 
organizational routines provide a useful starting point for an exploration of the pathways to 
organizational adaptability. The discussion below draws largely from Winter’s (2003) 
“Understanding Dynamic Capabilities.”  
An organizational routine is highly patterned, repetitious behavior that is learned, 
founded at least in part in tacit knowledge and directed toward specific objectives. Thus, 
behaviors to run a particular production line to produce a particular product constitute a 
routine. Organizational improvisation is not a routine because it is dynamic, one of kind, and 
conscious rather than patterned, repetitions, and tacit behavior. An organizational capability 
is a high-level routine that confers upon an organization’s management a set of decision 
options for producing a particular type of output.  
Recent research on strategy in rapidly changing environments has focused on 
dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Despite 
the name, dynamic organizational capabilities are based on routines and patterned, 
repetitious behavior. The dynamic refers to the focus of the routine. Ordinary organizational 
capabilities are operational capabilities. Those organizational capabilities that provide value 
exhibit technical and environmental fit, allowing an organization to “make a living” by 
performing a particular function well and also by allowing an organization to succeed within 
a particular environment, respectively.  Dynamic capabilities are organizational capabilities 
that extend, modify, or create ordinary capabilities, helping organizations shape and adapt 
to the environment, achieving evolutionary fitness. Dynamic capabilities involve sensing and 
shaping opportunities and threats, seizing opportunities, and maintaining competitiveness by 
combining, enhancing, protecting, and reconfiguring tangible and intangible assets. Zollo 
and Winter (2002) defined a dynamic capability as “a learned and stable pattern of collective 
activity through which the organization systematically generates and modifies its operating 
routines in pursuit of improved effectiveness” (p. 340). Examples of dynamic capabilities 
include systematic methods for changing operating routines and organizational capabilities 
for process research development, restructuring and re-engineering, and post-firm 
acquisition integration.  
According to Zollo and Winter (2002), dynamic capabilities are created through three 
learning mechanisms: experience accumulation, knowledge articulation, and knowledge 
codification, as shown in Figure 2 Knowledge articulation occurs when individuals express 
their opinions and beliefs, challenge each other’s viewpoints, and engage in constructive 
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confrontations. Knowledge articulation is a deliberate process through which groups and 
individuals seek to understand what works and what does not to complete a particular 
organizational task. Organizational and individual competence is enhanced when implicit 
knowledge is articulated through discussion, debriefing sessions, and assessments of past 
performance. These processes serve to improve individuals’ understanding of the causal 
mechanisms that link actions to outcomes. Articulation requires significant effort but can 
produce improved understanding of changes in links between action and performance. 
Articulation can thus result in adaption of existing routines.   
 
 Learning, Dynamic Capabilities, and Operating Routines 
(Zollo & Winter, 2002) 
Knowledge codification, occurs when articulated understandings are captured in 
writing, as in, for example, manuals, decision support systems, or project management 
software. Knowledge codification requires greater effort than articulation. Codification is 
challenging because it can be difficult to ensure that codified guidance is adequate, and also 
that such guidance is implemented and followed. The additional effort means that 
codification may be costly. Costs include the time, resources and attention invested in the 
development of task-specific tools, as well as the indirect costs of a possible increase in 
organizational inertia (because the now-codified routine is applied regularly, making change 
more difficult) or the inappropriate application of a codified routine.  
The development of dynamic capabilities is costly. Investments include financial, 
temporal, and cognitive resources that are directed toward improving understanding of 
action-performance linkages. The level of investment can be considered along a continuum. 
It will be lowest when a firm relies on the accumulation of experience in a semiautomatic 
fashion and more costly when the firm relies on knowledge articulation and even more so for 
codification. Dynamic capabilities require specialized personnel, committed to change roles, 
and, to be economically worthwhile, an opportunity to be exercised. 
According to some scholars, organizations operating in rapidly changing business 
environments require dynamic organizational capabilities, which can be “harnessed to 
continuously create, extend, upgrade, protect and keep relevant the enterprise’s unique 
asset base” (Teece, 2007, p. 1319). However, although dynamic capabilities have attracted 
attention, they are not the only means of organizational adaptation and change. Firms can 
also adapt and change through ad hoc or one-time problem solving. Ad hoc problem solving 
is not repetitious and highly patterned. It typically occurs in response to unpredictable events 
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in the environment. Whereas the development and maintenance of dynamic capabilities 
requires ongoing specialized investments in personal and attention, the costs of ad hoc 
problem solving disappear when there is no problem to solve. The costs of ad hoc problem 
solving are largely opportunity costs associated with the attention given the problem. If the 
problem is no longer presented, attention shifts and costs are relieved. Thus, so-called 
routine capabilities, augmented when needed with ad hoc problem solving, may be the more 
cost effective response to achieving organization adaptation (Winter, 2003). 
The responses of the acquisition community to the change in warfighters’ needs, 
exemplified in this study through the case of the JCTD office, can be considered a 
successful example of ad hoc problem solving. The reaction of the community; creating 
organizations and processes to fill a particular need from existing organizations, budgets, 
and processes; learning on the job; and forging one-time solutions are all examples of ad 
hoc problem solving, creative innovation to a particular problem.  
As discussed previously, such problem solving may be more cost effective than 
creating a dynamic capability. This is particularly true when an environment is ambiguous 
and unpredictable or competitors are likely to copy one’s success. The long-term response 
to the need for rapid fielding during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan should take into 
account the “success” of this problem-solving approach. An evolutionary approach to 
organizational change would suggest that the variation of organizations and processes be 
subject to environmental selection, whereby only those exhibiting fit with the environment 
are likely to survive. Thus, if in fact rapid fielding remains a paramount need, we would 
expect the creativity that fostered the organizations that met that need to find a way to 
continue to meet it. History suggests that those within the DoD are adept at doing this. 
Alternatively, however, if rapid fielding is not required, the costs of developing this “dynamic 
capability” may be misplaced. 
DoD acquisition has exhibited a long history of resistance to change. Given the 
bureaucratic make-up of the DoD and the size of the organization, this is not surprising. 
Further, bureaucratic processes are appropriate in some situations (particularly those 
involving great risk) and may be a necessity for the DoD. However, as many have noted, 
DoD organization structure and processes were well adapted to the post-WWII–Cold War 
era, and since 2001 that stable environment no longer exists. Thus, many DoD routine 
capabilities may have technical fit—they fit well with a particular function, such as the 
acquisition of large, complicated weapons systems to meet the needs of many players when 
time and money are abundant—but may not fit with the new environment. The question then 
becomes, what is the best way to adapt to the new environment.  
One must be somewhat cautious in making direct comparisons between the 
competitive business environment—where success is generally defined as earning greater 
financial returns than one’s rival—and the multifaceted environment facing the DoD 
acquisition community. The discussion above suggests that ad hoc problem solving should 
not be discounted out of hand and without consideration. Such solutions allow the DoD to 
adapt in low cost manner without attempting to change the overall bureaucracy. Although 
developing dynamic organizational capabilities may be possible, doing so is clearly costly 
and difficult, as exemplified by the many failed attempts with the DoD and in industry. An 
alternate perspective on ad hoc problem solving suggests that these solutions should be 
rewarded, and perhaps structural changes should be designed to allow such solutions to 
emerge and dissipate as needed, rather than automatically seeking codification, 
centralization, and formalization. This is particularly salient if one considers that the 
environment may continue to change. The organizations and processes that have emerged 
and evolved to exhibit technical and environmental fit for the environment following the 
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September 2001 attacks may not fit the environment of the future. Ad hoc problem solving is 
a low-cost alternative for allowing adaptability within the large bureaucracy. 
Implementing Change—An Additional Consideration 
As noted above, this research suggests that reforms should consider how to take 
advantage of the ad hoc problem solving skills of the DoD acquisition community. 
Furthermore, the discussion suggests that, when codification of learning is undertaken, then 
much of the value of such efforts lies in the process, rather than in the end. Capturing this 
value requires a collaborative, “safe” environment that facilitates knowledge sharing. The 
acquisition community can be viewed as a system, composed of many different types of 
actors and organizations, operating in an uncertain environment subject to shocks and 
subsequent turbulence. Although, some competition within systems is beneficial, a long 
history of research documents the deleterious effects of competitive environments on 
knowledge sharing at the individual level and of prices wars and “hyper-competition” on 
industry profitability at the systems level. Policymakers should be aware of the potential 
consequences of such negative competition and structure reforms to minimize its likelihood. 
Scholars argue that in business landscapes characterized by great turbulence, 
traditional competitive actions may not lead to an advantage but may rather result in further 
turbulence. For example, organizations relying on dynamic capabilities to “turn themselves 
into moving targets”  moving faster, changing more quickly to avoid being “leapfrogged” by 
competitors, may increase field level turbulence (Delapierre & Mytelka, 1998, p. 78; Selksky 
et al. 2007, p. 79). Selksy et al. (2007) argued that success in turbulent environments hinges 
on collaborative endeavors to develop new field level processes, adaptive skills, and 
capabilities.  Selsky et al. (2007) illustrated these dynamics referencing a pair of studies of 
hospitals in hyper-turbulent environments. In response to changes in federal Medicare 
reimbursement programs, the states of California and Minnesota each made major reforms 
to their healthcare systems, resulting in a turbulent business environment. However, the 
healthcare industries in the two states experienced different outcomes.  
In 1982, California adopted a managed competition program in healthcare, creating 
incentives for providers to compete on price for government care for indigent citizens. At the 
same time, the federal government changed Medicare reimbursement procedures. 
Together, these events resulted in unanticipated turbulence in the business landscape of the 
state’s hospitals.  
California’s hospitals reacted immediately, over one six-week period during the 
study, two hospitals merged, one was acquired, and seven out of 30 hospitals experienced 
CEO succession. The hospitals entered mergers, alliances, and partnerships between 
hospitals, physicians, and insurance plans. These actions challenged traditional rules of 
competition within the industry, understandings about the domain and identity of hospitals, 
and the traditional boundaries between players in the healthcare field. For example, insurers 
became deliverers of care through investments in managed care organizations, hospitals 
became providers of care through offsite clinics, invading the traditional domain of doctors, 
and physicians took on new risks for the cost and quality of the services they offered by 
signing preferred or exclusive provide contracts.  
In response, the hospitals formed integrated networks seeking access to new 
markets, economies of scope and scale, and complements to their distinctive competencies. 
However, as the environmental turbulence continued to increase, the hospitals reacted with 
hyper-competitive moves actively disrupting previous competitive norms and each other’s 
competitive advantages. For example, preferred provider networks linked groups of 
physicians to particular provider hospitals and health plans. This restricted other hospitals’ 
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access to these physicians and spawned a bidding war. Medical staffs that had taken 
hospitals years to develop were decimated. Overtime, the competitive actions ceased to 
provide advantage and success and became only a requirement for survival. Smaller 
players were marginalized as larger, stronger organizations consolidated their control over 
resources. The region’s healthcare system continues to suffer from “huge systemic flaws: 
Rampant inflation, large numbers of uninsured, uneven and hard to measure quality and 
uncertain funding” (Rauber, 2005; Selsky, 2007). 
In response to the federal changes, Minnesota reconfigured its healthcare industry a 
decade later. Healthcare providers responded initially in a manner similar to those in 
California. However, in contrast to California’s hospital executives, those in Minnesota 
viewed themselves as the architects of a new organizational model. Minnesota’s executives 
constructed collaborative networks yielding “win” solutions for many players in the field. 
While vigorous competition continued, executives were able to anticipate some of the 
negative effects of their individual competitive actions in the extended field and to create a 
model of competition that partially controlled for those effects.  
In the end, the process of industry restructuring in California generated negative 
externalities, whereas industry transformation in Minnesota retained negative feedback 
brakes and avoided some of these effects. As illustrated by these examples, hyper-
competition in a turbulent environment can result in unanticipated negative effects. In 
California, failures to develop sustainable, collective strategies “echo in the form of failed 
alliances, labor problems and uncertain financial health” (Selsky, 2007), whereas the 
collaborative efforts of hospitals in Minnesota contributed to a more successful, field-level 
change. 
If successful adaptation in a turbulent environment is best achieved through 
collaborative effort, it is imperative that such collaboration between field players be fostered. 
Although comparisons between a competitive business environment and a public agency 
are not absolute, they can be enlightening. In the field of defense acquisition, there are 
many players. As in the hospital examples above, an environmental change resulted in a 
redefinition of the domain and roles, the emergence of new entities and partnerships, and 
the creation of new processes. If changes to the system lead to “hyper-competitive” 
behavior among the new players in the acquisition field now facing restructuring and/or 
between the new and traditional players, unanticipated negative outcomes can be expected.  
This suggests that if substantial reorganization and or codification of emergent 
processes is undertaken, the DoD should consider how to foster collaboration between the 
newly formed organizations to develop roles and patterns of interaction viewed as “wins” for 
multiple players in the field. Structural reform should be complemented by efforts to solicit 
and incorporate inputs from new and traditional field players with a view toward crafting a 
field solution. Achieving “the hope that, over time, the DoD acquisition community will 
understand the benefits of the rapid approach—and the countercultural stigma will dissolve” 
(Gansler, 2009, p. 26) may require active intervention to change perceptions, and at the 
very least, a thoughtful consideration of how to avoid worsening the problem when making 
structural changes. 
Conclusion 
This report describes the preliminary analysis and findings of our study exploring 
what drives successful organizational adaptation in the context of technology transition and 
acquisition within the DoD. It is based on our initial collection and analysis of archival and 
interview data. Our preliminary analysis suggests that ad hoc problem solving may be an 
undervalued yet broadly practiced skill set within the DoD. We are currently conducting a 
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second round of targeted interviews designed to illuminate how those in the JCTD office 
used ad hoc problem solving and organizational routines to field technology solutions. We 
will use the data to further explore how ad hoc problem solving may be used to support 
adaptive responses within the DoD acquisition community and to explicate criteria for 
determining when to rely on ad hoc problem solving versus when to invest in creating 
dynamic organizational capabilities. 
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